The Prisoner's Dilemma has been widely studied as a model for the evolution of cooperation, and most of this work has dealt with agents who either cooperate or not. In this paper we look at the consequences of allowing agents to have intermediate levels of cooperation, and to update these levels over time. The familiar strategy of \tit for tat" emerges as a robust mode of behaviour, yet there are important di erences between this case and that of \all or nothing" cooperation.
Introduction
The Prisoner's Dilemma is widely used in models for the evolution of cooperation in the presence of sel sh incentives. In such evolutionary models interactions between individuals take the form of \games" in which each participant can choose either to cooperate or to defect (not cooperate) at any one time. The two players then receive payo s amounting to tnesses which depend on their joint behaviour. By choosing appropriate values for these payo s one can model situations in which cooperation is best for the group but not for the individual.
In a Prisoner's Dilemma, if both players cooperate they each receive a \re-ward" payo R (say 3 or 4) whereas if they both defect they get a lesser \pun-ishment" payo P (usually set at 1). Thus mutual cooperation is favoured over mutual defection. The so-called dilemma arises in situations where defecting against a cooperator gives a \temptation" payo T which is higher than R, and the cooperator in this situation is made a \sucker" and receives a meagre S points (T = 5 and S = 0 being typical). In general the Prisoner's Dilemma is characterised by two relationships amongst these payo s:
T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. The rst ensures that defection is favoured over cooperation, while the second gives it a paradoxical quality: the combined total payo is highest for mutual cooperation. In fact there is no \paradox" or \dilemma", in that it is always better to defect in a one-shot game. That is, if the other player chooses to cooperate, the payo for defection is greater than for cooperation (T > R), and if the other player defects, it is better to defect than to cooperate and be made a sucker (P > S). In a Prisoner's Dilemma situation, no matter what the other player has chosen to do, defecting brings the higher reward.
Modeling the evolution of cooperation
There are many examples of animals which cooperate even though they appear to be receiving Prisoner's Dilemma payo s (Dugatkin, 1991; Milinski, 1987; Godard, 1993; Wilkinson, 1984; Hart & Hart, 1992 ), yet such behavior would not be expected to survive Darwinian selection pressure for long. One answer is that in many of these cases the \game" is not one-shot but consists of a series of interactions over time, and that the animals concerned have some memory for previous decisions and their outcomes. One now deals with the evolution of strategies, in that decisions for the current round are conditioned on the previous round or rounds. There are strategies in this iterated Prisoners Dilemma which are cooperative and yet able to resist defectors, the best known of which is \Tit for tat" (tft) (Axelrod, Axelrod and Hamilton) . tft starts by cooperating and thereafter simply copies what the other player did last time: it is a \memory 1" strategy in that it reacts only to the other player's latest action. Despite this simplicity it is very successful, being virtually unique in its ability to invade (that is, take over a population of) the strategy \always defect" (ad). However tft su ers in situations with \noise". In games between two tft's, a single accidental defection leads to an endless cascade of reprisals and counter-reprisals (Nowak & Sigmund, 1990) . tft is extremely provokable (which after all is what enables it to avoid exploitation by ad and thereby invade it), however this very property prevents it cooperating with itself in uncertain environments. Once tft is established, a better strategy to adopt is \generous tit for tat", which reciprocates cooperation but does not retaliate against defection every time. Instead, with some probability it cooperates even when the other player has defected. Provided this probability isn't too high, it combines Strict-tft's robustness against defectors with an ability to cooperate with itself. Nowak and Sigmund (1992) showed how Generous-tft could evolve in simulations. They modelled an in nite population made up of a number of strategists (typically less than ten at any one time), each of which consisted of two parameters, p C and p D . These give the probability of cooperating after a C (cooperate) or D (defect) by the other player. Two such strategists can then play one another and accumulate payo s over a long game; in the limit of a game of in nite length the payo (per timestep) is readily calculated. Population densities of particular strategies were altered using a simple approximation to evolutionary dynamics, with small amounts of new random strategies being added occasionally and nearly extinct ones being weeded out. In these simulations Generous-tft (p C = 1 and p D 1 3 given the usual payo s) appeared to be a stable end state, as almost any starting condition converged to it provided the run was long enough. This agreed precisely with theoretical work (Molander, 1985; Nowak & Sigmund, 1990) which showed the \optimal" value of generosity p D to be the minimum of (R ? P)=(T ? P) and 1 ? (T ? R)=(R ? S), which is 1 3 for R = 3 and 3 4 for R = 4, for example. \Optimal" in this case means that among strategies which are immune to invasion by less cooperative strategies, this is the one with the highest average payo when playing itself.
This treatment is readily extended to \memory 2" strategists, in which a player bases their decision not only on the other player's action but on their own previous action as well. Each player now consists of 4 probabilities of cooperating, p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD , re ecting the four states 1 in which it could nd itself (using the notation p co-player, player ). Note that the memory 1 case is recovered by restricting p CC = p CD and p DC = p DD . Nowak and Sigmund (1993) performed simulations of this case in the same way as before and, to their surprise, found a di erent strategy dominating the long term behavior. They called this strategy \Pavlov" or \win-stay, lose-shift" (wsls) because if it receives a good payo (either T or R) it repeats its previous action (D in the former and C in the latter). Conversely if it receives a low payo (P or S) it prefers to change its behavior next time. The wsls which \evolved" typically had values close to p CC = 1, p DC = 0, p CD = 0 and p DD 0:8. In particular this means it usually cooperates after mutual defection and continues to defect against a \sucker". Another view is that it plays Strict-tft if it cooperated last time, and \anti-tft" if it defected.
All this work assumed that the agents in question make their decisions simultaneously, whereas this is unlikely to be true for most biological systems. Frean (1994) looked at agents which make their decisions in alternation.
That is, player A makes a decision, player B responds to it, A then responds to that, and so on. This goes some of the way towards mimicking situations in which animals are continuously adjusting their decisions on the basis of the other animal's responses. It might be thought that this would make little di erence, but in fact it markedly changes the advantages enjoyed by all the well known strategies. Among memory 1 strategists, ad now dominates over Generous-tft (for R < 4), and in the memory 2 case a new and more robust strategy displaces wsls. This \ rm but fair" strategy (fbf) is like Generous-tft but is only generous after mutual defection: after being exploited it retaliates without exception. In this way it exhibits a \guarded" generosity, by venturing cooperation with a co-player whose defection might itself have been purely retaliatory (in other words it reacts di erently to unprovoked and provoked defections). Nowak and Sigmund (1994) have dealt with a closely related situation and come to similar conclusions.
3 Degrees of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma It may actually be quite rare to nd situations in which animals are faced with a choice between simply cooperating or defecting: in many cases it is more accurate to consider an action involving some degree of cooperation, which could be anywhere between 0 and 100 percent. For example, Milinski (1987) has studied \predator inspection" behavior in sh, in which a small number (often only a pair) of stickleback approach a potential predator, presumably to ascertain whether it poses a threat or not. The stickleback faces a Prisoner's Dilemma in this situation because on the face of it it is better for an individual sh to hang back rather than to go rst, and indeed Milinski has shown that some form of \tit for tat" strategy is used by such sh. In fact predator inspection is not a single decision but the product of many lesser decisions about how much to approach the (possible) predator. It could perhaps be considered the end result of many yes/no decisions made at every step of the approach, but it seems more natural to model the decisions as being ones of degree (how much to lead or follow the other sh) rather than a series of yes/no ones. Another example is the voluntary regurgitation of food for hungry vampire bats by other unrelated bats who have managed to nd food (Wilkinson, 1984) . Some portion of the contents of a full bat's stomach is donated to the other bat, hence it is again a matter of degree and not a simple yes/no decision.
Are the results from the binary case robust if we relax this strong assumption, and consider agents which can adopt degrees of cooperation between zero and one? For instance, does the continuous case also show dominant strategies, do they have the same character, and does timing a crucial factor as it is in binary situations? In order to answer such questions we must rst have a representation of what is meant by payo s and strategies in the continuous case.
Payo s
Suppose we have two agents X and Y , who adopt degrees of cooperation x and y respectively. We take these degrees to be 1 for complete cooperation and 0 for defection. The joint state of a airs can be pictured as a point (x; y) in the unit square. The payo s R, S, T and P refer to the reinforcement received at the four corners of this square. The most natural way to specify the payo for values of x and y other than 0 or 1 is to simply interpolate between the extremal payo s of the binary case. For instance if X is totally uncooperative, the payo Y receives depends on its degree of cooperation, and the most obvious way to do this is to interpolate linearly between punishment and sucker payo s P and S. Denoting (1) Figure 1 shows this payo surface, while gure 2 shows the combined payo the players receive in total.
Strategies
Recall that in the all-or-nothing case a strategy can be speci ed by the four numbers p CC , p CD , p DC and p DD . As with the payo s, these can be visualised as the heights of points above the four corners of a unit square representing the present states of the players. In the continuous case one needs to specify a degree of cooperation y 0 to follow every possible joint behavior, so a strategy is in e ect a surface in this picture: y 0 = f(x; y). In general any single-valued function with a range of zero to one is possible. An obvious simpli cation to make is to restrict our attention to strategies for which f amounts to linear interpolation from levels of cooperation speci ed at the four corners. given the usual values for the other payo s) it is simply an inclined plane of constant slope. With R = 3 it is steepest at the \temptation" corner. The payo surface for X is the same as for Y but with axes reversed. In the alternating case shown here, Y goes rst, then X, and so on. In the synchronous case both agents adopt new levels at the same time, so the trajectory is di erent, however convergence to the intersection of the lines is rapid and inevitable in either case. Notice that if agents were to update their decisions independently at random times the trajectory is the same as that of the alternating case.
the particular dynamics of the game. For short games one would expect the trajectory to be of some signi cance since it causes di erent payo s, however for longer games the payo at the intersection point dominates the total payo , and this is the same in both cases.
We can now relate this situation to the binary case. Consider two binary strategies X and Y playing a long game in which their overall probabilities of cooperation P(X) and P(Y ) are independent. Completely \memoryless" binary strategies cooperate with probabilities which are independent, trivially. However as Nowak and Sigmund (1990) point out, this is also true of long games between memory 1 strategists 2 making synchronous decisions 3 . Knowing this, the following must be true:
The probability of both X and Y cooperating is P(X) P(Y ), the probability of X cooperating and Y defecting is P(X)(1?P(Y )), and so on. The average payo payo resulting from such a game must then be R P(X) P(Y ) + T P(X) (1 ? P(Y )) + S (1 ? P(X)) P(Y ) + P (1 ? P(X)) (1 ? P(Y )) (6)
Comparing equations 5 and 6 with 3 and 1, we can see that (a) the probabilities converge to the same values as degrees of cooperation and (b) that at these values the payo s are the same. The results of the binary probabilistic case (for synchronous decision makers) therefore carry over directly to the linear case (synchronous or not). The dominant strategy must therefore be Generous-tft: Y 1 1 and Y 0 Y smallcrit 0 . This was con rmed in the simulations described in section 5. An agent's payo is determined by the intersection of the two lines as in gure 3, and we further know that this payo has the form of gure 1. It is reasonable to ask then, where is the best place to place say Y 's line so that the intersection gives the highest possible payo ? Clearly this depends on the line adopted by Y 's opponent, but it is interesting to note that if either player adopts Strict-tft behavior, it forces the joint state to lie on the line x = y, for which the payo slopes up rather than down with cooperation:
tft thus makes it \sel sh" for the other player to cooperate. Note however that if a strategy Y plays itself the two lines also intersect along x = y, and hence in the absence of defectors there will always be a temptation towards increased generosity, since it moves the intersection point higher.
Higher levels of generosity mean greater immunity to noise for tft-like players, resulting in evolution selecting for higher and higher values of Y 0 . This is tempered by the risk of invasion by defectors if the generosity gets too high.
One can get a feeling for why Y 0 ends up at the value it does by considering the introduction of a small amount of a completely unreactive strategy into a population dominated by Generous-tft. Assume the unreactive newcomer simply adopts a static degree of cooperation x, irrespective of its opponent's behavior. The maximum payo G X such a strategy receives when playing a tft with low generosity is obviously just R, obtained only for x = 1, its maximum value. We can calculate the gradient of this payo as generosity Y 0 increases, and evaluate it at x = 1: this comes out to be G X x j x=1 = R ? T + (R ? S)(1 ? Y 0 )
As expected, against Strict-sc tft this gradient is positive (since 2R > T + S is a condition of a prisoner's dilemma), indicating that x < 1 variants cannot earn payo s as high as R. However above Y 0 = 1 ? T ? R R ? S it is negative, indicating that there are x < 1 variants which get higher payo s than those with x = 1 (which get R) and therefore more than Y itself. If even a small amount of such a variant appears in a population of overly generous tft strategists it can begin to invade it.
We can also consider the score that ad gets against a majority of Generous- 5 Memory 2 strategists Memory 1 strategists are relatively easy to understand but limited: any actual agent would be expected to know its own previous behavior and to use this in determining its subsequent action. Although such strategies are a step more realistic, this self-dependence makes them more di cult to understand. In particular the long-term payo between memory 2 agents is problematic to calculate analytically. Instead, we simulate actual games between the two agents.
Section 5.2 describes how strategies can be played o against one another in an \evolutionary tournament", and section 5.1 describes how the payo s in individual games of this tournament were found.
Simulating long games between continuous strategists
Unlike the binary case, interactions between continuous strategists need not lead to a unique stable solution. One (very slow) method of evaluating the payo s is to simply run the simulated game for a great many iterations and nd the average payo for each player. Instead, in the simulations described here each pair of players meets for 50 iterations (each iteration being one decision by both players) and then the payo s are averaged over the next 10: these are taken to be the payo s that would be received over a very long game. The averaging over 10 iterations is much more important for highly non-linear strategies where cycles or even chaotic behavior are likely.
As in the binary case, the presence of at least some noise in perceptions or in carrying out actions can be expected to play a part in the e cacy of strategies. Rather than model the noise explicitly, its e ect is captured here by averaging over starting conditions. Instead of two players playing a single game, they play 25 games starting from initial states (0; 0), (0; 0:25),.. . ,(1; 0:75), (1; 1). This mimics the e ect that occasional but drastic errors would have on the average long-term payo s attained.
Evolutionary simulations
Following Nowak & Sigmund (1992; 1993) , we model a nite number strategies in a large population. This is done by keeping track of the proportion of each strategy over time: we begin with a single \indi erent" strategy Y 11 = Y 10 = Y 01 = Y 00 = 0:5 occupying 100% of the population. On average every 100 generations a new randomly generated strategy appears, initially making up 0.2% of the total population appears. These new strategies are generated by choosing each of the four parameters from the U-shaped distribution ( (1 ? )) ?1=2 , which favours parameters close to zero or one 4 .
With each new generation the following steps are carried out. Firstly the total expected payo of each strategy present is obtained by playing long games against each of the other strategies (and itself). The scores from these games are then weighted by prevalence in the population of the other player. The proportions of all the strategies are then altered by making the reproductive rate of each strategy proportional to the average payo it accrues (Taylor & Jonker, 1979; Maynard Smith, 1982) , giving
where Y is the proportion and G Y is the total expected payo of strategy Y .
Equation 7 ensures the growth of any strategy whose total payo exceeds the average. Finally any strategy making up less than 0.1% of the population is deemed \extinct" and weeded out.
The overall picture is then as follows: random strategies appear in a model population at random times, most of these are destined to die out die out fairly quickly but occasionally one arrives which can increase its proportion Y and become the dominant strategy in the population. We are interested in the composition of such a population in the long term.
The evolution of a continuous form of Generous-tft
As an initial check on the simulation, new strategies were restricted to be memory 1. After 10 6 generations, the vast majority of surviving strategists were indeed Generous-tft, with an average generosity exactly that predicted (namely 1 3 for R = 3 and 3 4 for R = 4). As expected, the timing of the interaction did not matter: whether the players updated their states in synchrony or in alternation made no di erence to their nal payo s and hence the dominant strategy. Figure 4 shows what happens in the memory 2 case for R = 3. To make the plot, every 2000 generations a strategy was drawn from the population with a probability equal to it's prevalence. The data shown here come from a particular run, but many di erent starting conditions, di erent random seeds, and both alternating and synchronous dynamics were tried out, and they all converge rapidly to the same values. after maximally exploiting the other player by completely defecting when they cooperate. \Apologetic" cooperation is strongly favoured, just as it is in simple tft. Note that this is in sharp contrast to the \win-stay, loseshift" strategy found in the synchronous binary case, where successful agents continue to exploit a sucker in this situation. Together Y 11 and Y 10 mean that once cooperation is established, strategies which do not reciprocate with a cooperator are strongly selected against. Y 01 denotes the level that follows being made a sucker (ie. where ones own cooperation meets with complete defection). Intriguingly the nal value is centered on 1 3 , which coincides with the optimal generosity for memory 1 strategists. This was con rmed for R = 4, ie. the value always arrives at 3 4 in that case. Again this is unlike the all-or-nothing strategies wsls and fbf, which prefer never to cooperate in this situation. Finally, one might expect that Y 00 would follow Y 01 just as Y 10 followed Y 11 (this would be the familiar Generous-tft strategy) or perhaps that Y 00 would be close to 1, as it is in the binary case (wsls and fbf both have this character). In fact it simply plummets to zero and stays there: mutual defection leads not to a \fresh start" or generosity at all, but only to more defection. increases its level at each iteration and will reach full mutual cooperation quickly, yet it does so without the risk of being generous at x = 0. 4 , the optimal value where R = 4. The dotted line is y = x, to which both curves tend as R tends towards its lower limit of (T + S)=2 (which is 2:5 given the usual values). can take which makes it invasion-proof against both ad and \cooperative" unreactive strategies. This agrees well with the value found in simulations for a variety of prisoner's dilemma payo settings.
6 Non-linear strategists So far we have looked at linear strategists, which simply interpolate linearly between their extremal behaviors to arrive at general responses. This section describes a way to parameterise non-linear strategies and shows a particular example of its evolution.
Non-linear memory 1 strategies consist of curves rather than straight lines. A wide variety can be captured by using four parameters to de ne a cubic is in the memory 2 case). Nevertheless the average level of cooperation remains high throughout, so although not stable, as a group these strategists are cooperative. Figure 10 shows a selection of those that made up the population after 40 million generations. Note that any strategy which remains above the line x = y, as these all do, is guaranteed to reach full cooperation with itself. Unlike the linear case, there is no real convergence to a steady level of generosity to defectors. Instead there is a restless interplay of invasions and re-invasions between strategists which are all broadly cooperative. The particular dynamics (alternating or synchronous) seemed to make little di erence to this outcome.
Discussion
One fascinating aspect of the PD is that it potentially gives evolutionary situations in which the average payo decreases, even though the highest scoring individuals are being advanced at every generation. In the iterated prisoner's dilemma however cooperation can be stabilised as these simulations (and many others before) have demonstrated. This paper has examined whether the conclusions from the all-or-nothing case carry over to that of degrees.
There are strong similarities between the two scenarios. The continuous analogue of tit-for-tat presents itself in various guises, and its status as a robust mode of behavior is con rmed. In particular there is an exact correspondence in the memory 1 case, in that binary synchronous agents This however highlights one marked di erence: with degrees of cooperation possible, the details of timing are largely irrelevant. This is certainly true for linear memory 1 players and appears to be true in practice for the other cases too. In particular if it is known that interactions are not synchronous, successful strategies in the continuous Prisoner's Dilemma are not the same as those of the all-or-nothing case. In the former we expect some form of Generous-tft while in the latter ad is the predicted outcome. There is also a striking di erence between successful memory 2 strategies in the two cases.
In the binary case both wsls and fbf cooperate after mutual defection, and never cooperate immediately after being a sucker. Without the binary probabilistic assumption both these behaviors are di erent. In particular, mutual defection leads only to more defection, at least in the short term. The reason for this may be that in the binary case the only route back to mutual cooperation is via such a switch whereas in the degrees case players can work their way back to cooperation step-by-step in relative safety.
Axelrod's seminal studies established the signi cance of tit-for-tat, but this position has waned as the original simulations were made more realistic. Accounting for \noise" in actions (via occasional errors) and in timing (via asynchronous dynamics) has made tit-for-tat look less signi cant that would have been thought at rst. Including partial degrees of cooperation has the reverse e ect, and would seem to reinstate tit-for-tat in its former role in models for the evolution of cooperation in competitive environments.
